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declared war on Tsarist Russia, but refused to do so in 1940 on Soviet Russia, although she owed much to the former and nothing to the latter. Even then, in 1915, she was obliged to intern a good many politicians and generals before embarking on her campaign, a campaign which, in actual fact, both sides conducted in 'slow motion'. The Russian Black Sea Fleet fired fifty-nine shells on Varna; in the Dobrudja, the Bulgarians were opposed to the Rumanians and to the Serbian Corps, while the Germans were engaged with the Russians of Chtcherbatchev. This realist nation, little given to passionate or ideological enthusiasms, nevertheless showed a curious obstinacy in 'backing the wrong horse'. In 1913, 1915, and 1942, they entered the war with the winners, and came out of it with the vanquished. The 'Macedonian psychosis' periodically pushed them into the arms of 'liberators', only to end by sharing their defeat.

After the Treaty of Neuilly, the Bulgarian propagandists realised the error made by their leaders. They returned to the theme of Slavonic affinities, to the pro-Russian tradition. 'We Bulgarians', said the *Narodna Otbrana*,[13] 'have been the pioneers of a foreigners' policy, and have pulled the chestnuts out of the fire for others'. 'The future of Bulgaria is closely bound up with that of Russia', proclaimed the Minister, Bakalov.[14] And Stamboliiski entered into a mortal struggle with the Macedonian organisation, to clear the way for an entente with Belgrade. He succumbed in this struggle; his successors realised, after much shilly-shallying, that this policy was a reasonable one, but could not be imposed until the psychological atmosphere it had always lacked had been prepared for it.

And yet, paradoxical as it may seem, in the thick of the fratricidal struggles in which she has engaged, Bulgaria has never stifled her inner feeling of community of destiny with Serbia. When the Bulgarian resistance collapsed in 1918, a Deputy-Prefect of the occupying authorities took leave of the inhabitants of his administrative district in these terms: 'We shall perhaps

[13] Of June 30, 1920.

[14] The Bulgarian Church, like the Serbian-Orthodox Church, refused to make the religious calendar coincide with the civil calendar when the State adopted the Gregorian reckoning. The two Churches gave, as the reason for this refusal, the fact that it was impossible to come to an agreement with the Russian Church, which then had no competent representative.

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common with the Croatian Orthodox Metropolitan, Hermogene Maximov, and the German Lutheran bishop, Popov).

Arrested on September 18, 1946, Mgr. Stepinac was tried, on the 30th of the same month, not only on the charge of intelligence with the enemy, but also of having, after the liberation, worked with the opponents of the régime. These charges (as well as that of having forcibly converted Orthodox Christians to Catholicism) were upheld by the judges, who condemned the prelate (on October 11) to sixteen years' hard labour, to the loss of his civic rights for a period of five years, and to the confiscation of all his possessions. In vain had the defence recalled the fact that Mgr. Stepinac had protested against the racial laws and collective reprisals, and that the allied press had, while the war was actually in progress, rendered homage to his courageous stand.[5]

Pope Pius XII, in a public speech, protested against this verdict, denying the compulsory conversions—which, moreover, are contrary to canon law. And, although Tito had declared that the proceedings were by no means the prelude to a campaign against the Church in Czechoslovakia, Christian circles throughout the world protested against what they called a 'religious trial'. The 115 Catholic archbishops and bishops of the United States, assembled in Washington for their annual Assembly, described the verdict as 'an outrage on justice'. The Archbishop of Westminster declared that, during the war, 'in Croatia the only voice raised against Nazism and its works had been that of Archbishop Stepinac'.

The Vatican, in an unofficial note, recalled the Church's sanctions against members of the laity sitting in judgement on a bishop, or guilty of any act of violence upon his person; it nevertheless continued to maintain its Nuncio in Belgrade—Mgr. Patrick Hurley, a priest of American nationality, who had entered upon his office at the beginning of the year. In October, 1946, it appointed a co-adjutor to the Bishop of Maribor and another to the Bishop of Ljubljana. (In the absence of a

[5] A Catholic Agency announced, at the end of February 1947, that the President of the Croatian Government, Dr. Bakarich, was said to have invited the prelate to sign his appeal, giving him reason to hope that he might be liberated and, with American support, go abroad. Mgr. Stepinac refused, not wishing to leave either his people or his diocese.

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Concordat in Yugoslavia, the Vatican proceeds directly to the appointment of bishops, without previous agreement with the Government.)

Relations between the Holy See and Belgrade again became strained when on January 31, 1947, Tito's Government handed to the Secretariat of State two notes, demanding the handing over of five Yugoslav 'war criminals', said to have taken refuge in the Vatican, and accusing the latter of having facilitated the escape to South America of other Yugoslav nationals, wanted by their country's police. The Pope denied these allegations, but added 'that he distinguished between those who were persecuted for political reasons, and criminals; to the former he gave every assistance in his power, without asking whence they came'.

Yugoslavia's external policy remained unshakeably based on Soviet support. 'The Slav peoples now look to Moscow as, after 1919, they looked to Paris; nothing is more natural', said a semi-official commentary on Tito's tour of Central Europe. Far from endeavouring to gain the confidence of the English and the Americans, whose co-operation a wise diplomacy would have sought, in order to bring their claims on Trieste to a successful conclusion, the Belgrade Government was continually in conflict with those powers.

Its relations with Washington were particularly chequered. On January 8, 1946, President Truman had declared: 'As regards Yugoslavia, recognition of the present Government is still subject to certain conditions'. (Moreover, he put Rumania and Bulgaria on the same footing.)

These 'conditions' were the assurance that the new Yugoslavia would recognise the existing treaties and agreements between the two countries (commercial exchanges, extraditions, naturalisations, etc.). Having obtained this assurance on April 18, he recognised Tito and appointed Mr. Richard Patterson ambassador in Belgrade. 'In granting diplomatic recognition', said the *Washington Post* next day, 'the United States are but looking unpleasant realities in the face'.

And when Sava Kosanovich, the representative of Yugoslavia, presented his credentials to President Truman, the latter said to him, with bantering courtesy: 'The United States are following, with interest and sympathy, the efforts of the Yugoslav people . . . to succeed, individually and in harmony with the United